Building on insights from the economics of superstars, I develop an efficient method for estimating the skill of mutual fund managers. Outliers are especially helpful for disentangling skill from luck when I explicitly model the cross-sectional distribution of managerial skill using a flexible and realistic function. Forecasted performance is dramatically improved relative to standard regression estimates: an investor selecting (avoiding) the best (worst) decile of funds would improve risk-adjusted performance by 2% (3%) annually. Forecasted performance also helps to predict fund flows, consistent with the smart money effect. The distribution of skill is found to be fat-tailed and positively skewed; its shape helps to explain the convexity of fund flows.
Introduction
With over $3 trillion in aggregate assets under management, the scale of the active mutual fund industry is a testament to the conviction among investors that skilled managers exist and can be identified in advance. Yet the unpredictability of good performance remains the principal stylized fact in the mutual fund literature, and is often interpreted to imply the absence of skill among fund managers and the inability of investors to benefit from active mutual funds. 1 In this paper, I will show that this "fact" is the consequence of strong, unrealistic, and often implicit assumptions about the distribution of "alpha"-namely that alphas are independent across funds, or that alpha is normally distributed. I propose a hierarchical model of investment performance that relaxes both assumptions, and I provide empirical support for alternative "facts": alphas are predictable, and extreme performance is not always luck.
The assumption that alphas are independent across funds is what justifies any fund-by-fund approach to performance evaluation. 2 Although seemingly reasonable, Jones and Shanken (2005) show that this is equivalent to assuming, counterfactually, that the distribution of alphas across managers is known.
In the realistic case where the distribution of alphas is acknowledged to be unknown, the returns of all funds intuitively help to illuminate the abilities of fund managers as a group, which in turn enables improved inference for any particular fund. Jones and Shanken present a hierarchical model that formalizes this cross-sectional "learning across funds".
They also impose normality on the cross-sectional distribution of alpha, but there is little evidence that alpha follows this convenient form. 3 Rather, it is a modeling choice intended to improve inference by reducing the influence of outliers. When extreme alpha estimates are thought to be spurious, reasonable remedies include shrinkage towards a normal distribution, or still more cautious parameter filters that simply drop funds with estimated alphas outside some allowable range. 4 The surviving funds' alphas can be interpreted with greater confidence, but little is learned about the dropped funds. This is a disadvantage of employing such sharp, and inherently subjective, parameter filters. But the larger cost of treating outliers as problematic statistical artifacts is that the extreme alphas might instead be the most interesting and informative caseseconomic rather than statistical outliers.
The "superstars" literature documents convex returns to talent across a range of disciplines. Rosen (1981) describes the phenomenon: "In certain kinds of economic activity there is concentration of output among a few individuals, marked skewness in the associated distributions of income, and very large rewards at the top." Subsequent work explores the pronounced disparities in, for example: CEO compensation, rock concert revenues, television ratings for NBA games, and citation counts for finance academics. 5 Across diverse fields of endeavor, observed outcomes are distinctly non-normal and positively skewed, regardless of the distribution of underlying, and unobservable, talent. Viewed through this lens, extreme alphas are the natural result of differences in innate investment skill.
This perspective requires some semantic clarification. Alpha is often considered synonymous with investing skill, but these are distinct concepts. Investment skill itself-like the related attribute of intelligence-cannot be directly observed, although it is associated with observable manager characteristics.
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Alpha is a measure of investment performance, an outcome that we expect to be increasing in managerial skill. The economics of superstars shows that the mapping between talent and outcomes is often convex, and that extreme alphas may be the rule rather than the exception. The approach to performance evaluation in this paper incorporates these insights. 7 (For the sake of consistency with the mutual fund literature, alpha and skill are used interchangeably in the rest of this paper.)
I present a hierarchical model where the cross-sectional distribution of alpha is described by a mixture-of-normals, and each fund manager represents a draw from this distribution. The mixture-of-normals is a flexible and realistic modeling choice, allowing-but not imposing-both skewness and fat tails. The data will dictate whether these features are present.
Out-of-sample tests reveal significant short-term alpha predictability. The "mixture" alphas are striking improvements over the estimates from OLS, which in turn outperform alphas from a hierarchical model with a normal crosssectional distribution: imposing the wrong structure on the cross-section of alpha can be worse than imposing no structure at all. The bottom decile portfolio of mutual funds formed using the mixture-of-normals distribution is more than twice as bad as the OLS bottom decile portfolio, while the top "mixture" portfolio is nearly twice as good as the OLS top portfolio. (The alphas of the top and bottom "mixture" decile portfolios are +5.4% and -6.1%, respectively.)
I find that the true distribution of alpha is fat-tailed and positively skewed, consistent with the economics of superstars. I also find that fund flows are sensitive to these "mixture" alphas-evidence that investors respond to, and benefit from, the skills of mutual fund managers. Finally, I show that the nonnormality of the alpha distribution can help to explain the convexity of fund flows.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the hierarchical model in detail. Section 3 explains the data used for the analysis. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 discusses these results and their relation to the mutual fund literature. Section 6 concludes.
Model
I adopt a hierarchical Bayesian model, similar in spirit to Jones and Shanken (2005) , that allows for skewness and fat-tails in the cross-sectional distribution of managerial skill. The parameters of this distribution are determined by the data, including "outliers". Skill is measured relative to a four-factor model including the Fama and French (1993) factors and the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) . Prior distributions are weakly informative-proper but diffuse.
Background
The (semi-strong) efficient markets hypothesis implies that abnormal mutual fund returns should not persist. Carhart (1997) provides strong supporting evidence: adjusting for a momentum factor in addition to the three Fama-French (1993) factors produces ranked portfolios of mutual funds without significant persistence among top performing funds. However, Berk and Green (2004) showed that if fund returns are decreasing functions of assets under management, the absence of persistence in factor-model skill estimates is not inconsistent with the existence of skill. 9 Furthermore, studies using shorter holding periods than the one-year holding periods employed by Carhart have found evidence of persistence. 10 Skill may indeed exist, but it appears difficult to identify.
8 Fund flows are much more responsive to high performance than to poor performance. 9 Berk and Green (2004) also assume rational investor learning in the context of a commonknowledge prior on the distribution of skill. This is an unrealistic feature of their model. 10 See, e.g., Bollen and Busse (2004 Mamaysky et al. (2007) demonstrate that ". . . sorting on the estimated alphas populates the top and bottom deciles not with the best and worst funds, but with those having the greatest estimation error." Carhart's result appears less damning upon reconsideration: alpha may seem non-persistent simply because it is poorly measured.
One "solution" is to drop funds with suspiciously extreme alphas. Another approach is to use shrinkage estimators. head-on. The prevailing cross-sectional distribution of skill among mutual fund managers is indeed complex, but it is not intractable.
Model specification
Excess fund returns are assumed to follow a standard linear factor structure,
11 They assume a standard factor model with independent residuals, as in (1 where ε j t ∼ N 0, V j ε , factor loadings β j and residuals ε j are cross-sectionally uncorrelated, and the T × K matrix of factor returns F is observable.
The investor assumes that true manager alphas are independent draws from a finite mixture of two normal distributions, with density
where N = 2, φ (x) is the standard normal density, µ i and V i are the unknown mean and variance of mixture component i, and the w i are unknown non-negative weights that sum to one. 13 This conditional distribution of alpha is simple and flexible, allowing both skewness and excess kurtosis in the crosssection of managerial skill but imposing neither.
14 It also suggests an intuitive interpretation of the two mixture components as "good" and "bad" manager types.
Greater flexibility could be achieved at the expense of parsimony. Increasing the number of normal mixture components is straightforward, although interpretation is problematic for N ≥ 4. One could alternately employ finite mixtures of Student's t or Laplace distributions-imposing excess kurtosis-or a more general unimodal skewed distribution.
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In the absence of strong justification for any specific alternative distribution, however, it is reasonable to begin with the simplest choice that allows some variability in skewness and kurtosis. The distribution in (2) fits the bill, while minimizing computational complexity and the impact of specification searching.
Bayesian approach
The hierarchical model defined by (1) and (2) is conceptually simple, yet estimation with classical methods is not feasible. Consider the sheer number of parameters: for each of the J funds there are K + 2 parameters, in addition 13 Without additional restrictions, the mixture of normals in (2) is not identified. An additional identifying restriction, µ 2 ≥ µ 1 , is imposed without loss of generality to allow estimation. Stephens (2000) describes the problem in more detail and proposes an alternative resolution.
14 The distribution is conditional because it depends on the unknown population hyperparameters (µ i , V i , w i ) that will be estimated along with the fund-level parameters A common criticism of Bayesian inference is that the inherently subjective prior distribution can exert substantial influence on posterior parameter estimates. I minimize subjectivity by choosing intentionally uninformative priors.
By this, I mean diffuse proper distributions. These are sometimes also called weakly informative priors to distinguish them from improper priors.
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Putting aside complex approaches to uninformative priors that are themselves subject to criticism, 19 I follow the pragmatic lead of Leamer (1978) : 16 The K + 2 parameters are the managerial skill and the idiosyncratic variance, in addition to K factor loadings. 17 See, e.g., Robert and Casella (2004) . 18 Any valid probability density must have a finite integral over the relevant parameter space. An improper prior is a function whose integral is infinite, hence the impropriety. Typical improper priors would be f (θ) ∝ 1 for a location parameter, or f (σ) ∝ 1 σ for a scale parameter. While superficially appealing, such priors do not always lead to valid posteriors. (See, e.g., Lindley (1972) .) They are not even uninformative. The improper prior f (θ) appears to be uninformative with respect to θ, but it also suggests that |θ| is extraordinarily large and that 
Hierarchical structure
Having specified a complete Bayesian model in some detail, it may seem selfdefeating to select priors that convey no information. Such a view overlooks the importance of the hierarchical structure of the model. The power of this structure to influence posterior parameter estimates is not undone by arbitrarily diffuse priors, as long as they are proper. 23 Indeed, the chief justification for choosing diffuse priors is to ensure that the estimation results are driven by the model itself rather than any specific choice of priors.
If we altered the model to eliminate (2) and estimated (1) with diffuse priors, this would be equivalent to OLS. However, the estimates generated by the full model are radically different from those given by OLS-these differences must be attributed to the hierarchical structure itself.
20 pp. 61-63, emphasis added. 21 A more common choice would be inverse-gamma distributions, which have the virtue of conjugacy. However, these are not consistent with condition (i) or Leamer's rule of thumb, especially when the posterior parameter estimates are likely to be close to zero. See Gelman (2006) . 22 This results in a marginal prior for each w i that is beta distributed with parameters 1 and N − 1. For the degenerate case where N = 2 that is employed here, this is simply the uniform distribution on the unit interval. 23 Improper priors are another story, since they can effectively preclude the cross-sectional learning that is integral to hierarchical model estimation. 
Multiple share classes
The cross-sectional distribution of skill in (2) can only be estimated if each fund in the sample represents a distinct draw from the distribution. Many mutual funds have multiple share classes, and each class appears in the CRSP database as a separate fund. To proceed with the analysis, these "funds" need to be identified in order to avoid double-counting. Unfortunately, there is no explicit share class variable in the database.
CRSP suggests matching "funds" that share the same portfolio of holdings, but portfolio data are not available until 1998. The only alternative is to examine management company and fund names, matching as deemed appropriate.
This latter approach is employed here.
Funds without fund name data are consequently excluded from the analysis.
This affects approximately 10% of the funds at the beginning of the sample in 1961 but generally disallows less than 5% of all funds. Although most random pairs of funds have names that are nothing alike, some pairs have names that are nearly identical.
Funds with Levenshtein distances less than 3 are assumed to be share classes of a single actual fund. From each grouping of fund share classes, the class with the most assets under management is retained to represent the fund. Figure 2 shows the total number of "funds" in the CRSP database, the number of funds 25 The Levenshtein distance between two strings is the minimum number of edits needed to transform one string into the other, with the allowable edit operations being insertion, deletion, or substitution of a single character. See Levenshtein (1966) . that have fund name data, and the number of true funds that survive the share class filter.
Fund objectives
This analysis is confined to actively managed domestic equity mutual funds. 
Fund managers
Data on fund managers in the CRSP database are not comprehensive. No manager name data is available before 1998. Even after 1998, in many cases, the fund manager field is missing or recorded as team. 26 Utilizing individual fund manager data is therefore not feasible without impoverishing the sample.
The full impact of requiring individual manager data is depicted in Figure 3 .
One consequence of the lack of reliable manager data is that the funds themselves become the objects of analysis. Ideally, when a fund changes its portfolio manager, the new prior on its alpha would depend on the new manager's previous fund's returns. Since the data do not allow managers to be tracked in this way, I use funds' returns as if no management changes have occurred. 27 This does not introduce any bias but does weaken the model's predictive ability for funds that have changed managers during the evaluation period. 26 Massa et al. (2010) discuss why fund management companies may elect to have anonymously managed funds. 27 This approach assumes fund returns are generated according to (1) and depend only on the fund manager. If the fund family makes a difference, then future returns are related to past returns even after a managerial change. Brown and Wu (2011) estimate such a model in a Bayesian setting.
Results
For each month, alphas are estimated for all funds with at least 12 monthly observations during the 2-year window [t − 23, t]. Funds are evaluated using each of three methods: OLS, hierarchical Bayes with a mixture-of-normals prior, and hierarchical Bayes with a "standard" normal prior. 28 All funds are ranked according to their estimated alphas and assigned to deciles. Funds that are missing during month t + 2 are dropped; equally-weighted portfolios are formed from the remaining funds. 29 These portfolios are held for one month and then rebalanced according to the updated alpha estimates.
Following Busse and Irvine (2006) , the alpha of each of these decile portfolios is estimated using standard OLS regressions. When estimating the alpha of a portfolio of funds, there is likely to be little difference between the OLS measure and any reasonable Bayesian measure based on the same model. Using the OLS post-ranking-period measure avoids any bias that could result from using the Bayesian measure for both the ranking-period and the post-ranking-period.
Parameters of the mixture-of-normals distribution
Posterior means and 95% confidence intervals of the parameters in (2) are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . Each rolling estimation window is 24 months long, so the estimates depicted for month t correspond to fund performance during the 
Comparison of skill distribution moments, by prior
Posterior moments of the distribution of skill for all three "priors" are shown in is constrained to have a kurtosis of three, while both OLS and the mixture model "agree" that kurtosis is likely to be much higher-although they diverge regarding how much higher. Here is clear evidence that the default Bayesian approach, with a normal prior on alpha, over-shrinks the estimated alphas in this case. Fitting to a normal distribution assumes away large outliers, while a more flexible model can learn from them.
Estimated cross-sectional distribution of alpha
The moments of the distribution of alpha are revelatory, but the distribution itself completes the story. The overall distribution of skill is shown in Figure   7 . This view makes the distribution appear normal, but the pivotal deviations from normality are in the tails. approximately zero probability to alphas larger than 0.6% monthly, component 2 assigns small positive probabilities to alphas as high as 3% monthly. Relative to a normal model of alpha, which completely discounts the possibility of "superstar" fund managers capable of dramatic outperformance, the mixtureof-normals allows the upper echelon of managers to exhibit superior alphas. Figure 8 . Alpha is monthly and measured in percent. The distribution appears generally normal in this zoomedout view, since the weight on mixture component 1 is much larger than the weight on mixture component 2. A closer examination of the tails, depicted in Figure 9 , reveals pronounced non-normality. Alpha is monthly and measured in percent. The probability of observing extremely high alphas is several orders of magnitude higher than it would be in a model that imposed normality on alpha, a result of allowing for the second component.
Decile portfolio performance
Decile portfolios are formed using all three ranking methods and their abnormal returns are estimated using OLS. The power of the mixture-of-normals prior is made clear in this test. Numerical results are given in Table 1 and shown graphically in Figure 10 .
Even OLS reveals substantial short-term predictability. The worst funds (deciles 1 and 2) continue to under-perform and the best funds (deciles 9 and 10) continue to outperform. Carhart documented persistent poor performance over a longer time frame, attributing it to high fees. Bollen and Busse, among others, have more recently documented persistent outperformance in the short term using OLS. Thus, the results from the OLS decile portfolios are just as expected.
Results using rankings from the normal hierarchical model are telling-they are substantially weaker than those from OLS. The performance of the bottom decile portfolio is better than the OLS bottom decile portfolio, and the performance of the top decile is worse. The normal prior does a worse job of sorting 
Fund-by-fund alpha correlations
The mixture model generates superior portfolios of funds; its fund-level estimates are better as well. Using the same two-year estimation windows, we can 
Funds that do not appear in both intervals are dropped before the correlation is computed. I expect that the typical fund used in this part of the analysis is consequently better than average. Even if the level of alpha is biased upwards, this does not imply that the serial correlation is biased.
When comparing the performance of two models, k 1 and k 2 , in predicting the estimates generated by model k 3 , it is also useful to define: Table 2 : In Panel A, serial correlations of estimated fund alphas are computed for rolling, non-overlapping, two-year intervals, 1961-2010. In the last two columns, the hierarchical models are used to predict OLS alphas. In Panel B, differences in these correlations are reported.
Results are shown in Table 2 . Panel B of Table 2 shows the differences in the correlations. In the second column, we can see that the mixture model's estimates are indeed more strongly serially correlated than the OLS estimates. Most critically, the third column
shows that the mixture model predicts the OLS estimates better than OLS itself.
Discussion and Implications
The persistent performance of the decile portfolios is impossible to fully reconcile with the rational model of Berk and Green (2004) . In their model, managers can possess investing skill but do not exhibit persistent non-zero alphas due to convexities in the costs of managing their funds. As funds grow in size, positive alpha becomes increasingly difficult to generate. In equilibrium all funds have 32 The same analysis was also performed using rank correlations with essentially identical results. 
Convexity of fund flows
Fund flows have a convex relationship with past fund performance. Outflows in response to poor performance are less pronounced than the inflows in response to good performance. Another possibility is that the optimal updating rule for posterior skill estimates is itself convex. While a normal prior (along with a normal likelihood)
gives rise to a linear updating rule, the mixture prior proposed here generates an updating rule that is nonlinear for observed returns that are not extremely far from zero, and convex over the region of greatest interest.
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Assume that the true cross-sectional distribution of skill is a mixture-ofnormals, as in (2). For comparison, I also consider a normal prior on skill. To obtain the best approximation, the mean and variance of the normal prior are set to match the mean and variance of the mixture distribution:
and
Assume that fund returns are simply managerial skill plus Gaussian disturbances: a simplified version of the model in (1) with no risk factors.
After observing a single return R, investors update their estimates of managerial skill. The posterior expectation of skill under the normal prior is:
The posterior expectation of skill under the mixture prior is:
where
To make this more concrete, the posterior expectations, (7) and (8), of alpha corresponding to each of these priors after a single return R are shown in Figure   11 . Here we can easily see how sensitive the posterior beliefs are to the investor's prior, even when both possible priors have matching first and second moments. (5) and (6), we get the following parameters for the "matching" normal distribution: µ = −0.9 and V = 0.2. The updating rule for the normal prior is linear. The updating rule for the mixture prior has a linear asymptote but is nonlinear for non-extreme returns, and is generally convex for monthly returns between -4 and +4 percent.
The updating rule for the mixture prior is generally convex for non-extreme monthly returns. If the relationship between skill estimates and observed returns is convex, and the relationship between fund flows and skill estimates is not too concave, we should expect to observe convex flows.
The mixture-of-normals prior is not special in this regard. Any non-normal prior will generate a nonlinear updating rule. A more flexible prior than the two-component mixture should be able to match the observed flow-performance relationship even more closely. Results for a series of fund flow predictability regressions are shown in Table   3 . The dependent variable is the flow ratio, defined as the net fund flow divided by the fund's total assets under management in the previous month. Regression (1) is patterned after the baseline regression model of Sirri and Tufano (1998) .
Predictability of fund flows
This shows that investors are highly responsive to past returns, although they are more responsive to high returns than to low returns-the effect of being in the top quintile of past returns is positive and significant even after controlling for average past returns, R t − R mkt . This convexity is a robust feature of mutual fund flows.
Regression (2) adds the lagged OLS alpha as a predictor, while regression (3) adds the lagged Bayesian mixture alpha. Regression (4) includes them both. Regression (2) shows that investors are indeed responsive to the information in OLS alphas. This information does not subsume the effect of past returns, but the coefficient on R t − R mkt is somewhat closer to zero. Regression (3) shows that investors are also responsive to the information in Bayesian mixture alphas.
In regression (4), we see that both the OLS alphas and the Bayesian mixture alphas predict fund flows in a statistically significant manner. Although the point estimate of the coefficient on the Bayesian mixture alpha is higher than that of the OLS alpha, 0.33 versus 0.11, this difference is not significant. The key finding is that the information contained in the Bayesian mixture alphas, incorporating knowledge of the skewness and excess kurtosis in the cross-sectional distribution of alpha, influences investors' capital allocations, beyond the information contained in OLS alphas and directly in past returns. Although not statistically significant, it also appears that including the Bayesian mixture alphas, in regressions (3) and (4), decreases the convexity of fund flows, consistent with the theoretical predictions of section 5.1.
Smart money effect
A general finding in the literature is that mutual fund flows help to predict mutual fund performance. 36 The "smart money" effect refers to the interpretation that investors are actually able to anticipate future fund performance and allocate capital accordingly, but this is not the only interpretation. 37 One way to assess the "smartness" of investors is to examine the incremental impact that estimated alphas have for fund return prediction, controlling for fund flows. Table 4 presents estimates from a series of regressions seeking to explain fund returns in terms of past flows and returns. Regression (3) shows that past flows do predict fund returns; adding past returns in regression (4) weakens the predictive power of flows. As expected, regressions (1) and (2) Also noteworthy is the coefficient on lagged OLS alphas in regression (5) (1) is based directly on the baseline regression in Sirri and Tufano (1998), and shows both the responsiveness of flows to raw past performance, as well as the convexity of fund flows. (2) adds OLS alphas as a predictor, while (3) adds the Bayesian mixture alphas. (4) includes both alphas as predictors. Although overall R 2 does not change dramatically, the strongly significant coefficients on the Bayesian mixture alphas indicate that they contain information not contained in the other predictors, and that investors are sensitive to this information. 
Value of active management
Even if some fund managers possess skill, investors do not benefit unless managers generate positive alpha after management fees and trading costs. Since all alphas in this study are estimated using net fund returns to the investor, we can directly evaluate the prevalence of skill over time. Panel A of Figure 6 shows the overall mean of the prevailing distribution of skill-it does not diverge substantially from the implied OLS mean-which seems to lend support to the Berk and Green hypothesis: the typical fund has an alpha quite close to zero.
Looking at the mean alone is misleading, however. The most recent estimates in Figure 12 suggest that approximately 20% of managers have skill, although the fraction has been much higher in the past.
The volatility of the estimates over time and the magnitude of the maximum estimates rightly suggest that the distribution has not been perfectly estimated.
Nevertheless, the decile portfolios performed well: an imperfectly estimated distribution still greatly assists in the proper ordering of funds.
Even if sizeable fractions of managers possess skill after costs and fees, we Even still, it is safe to speculate that such an analysis would have conclusions somewhat more favorable to the mutual fund industry than French, given the higher fraction of skilled managers found here.
Conclusion
The model explored in this paper is deliberately kept simple to focus attention on the sensitivity of alpha estimates to the assumptions made regarding the cross-section of skill. Existing methodologies ignore the conclusions of the "superstars" literature: the returns to investing skill are likely to be positively skewed and fat-tailed. An optimal approach to performance evaluation should take this into account and explicitly model the cross-sectional distribution of alpha accordingly.
The hierarchical model I propose is such an approach. While it does not impose skewness or excess kurtosis, it "learns" from the data that such features are indeed present. Despite the simplicity of the mixture-of-normals distribution, the resulting estimates for fund alphas exhibit strong predictability across the entire population of funds-it is not merely the very best and the very worst funds whose performance persists.
In addition to accurately measuring fund alphas, this model also provides a possible explanation for the convexity of fund flows. Any non-normal prior on the distribution of alpha will lead to a nonlinear updating rule: high observed returns can exert much greater influence than low observed returns on the posterior mean of a given fund's alpha. The convexity of fund flows could thus be a rational response to the non-normality of alpha.
A MCMC Algorithm
This section provides details about the Bayesian inference procedure, including the priors on all parameters and a step-by-step summary of the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm used to generate samples from the joint posterior distribution of the parameters.
A.1 Parameters to be estimated 
A.2 Latent indicator
To simplify the estimation procedure, I introduce a latent J × 1 vector z, where each element is Bernoulli distributed,
The conditional (on z j ) prior on skill is now normal, instead of the original mixture of normals in (2):
A.3 Priors
All priors are proper but diffuse. They are scaled to correspond to the monthly percent returns used in the analysis. For example, an annual alpha of 12% would appear here as 1. 
A.4 Sampling algorithm
1. Draw z conditional on w, µ i , V i , α.
• Compute (vector) probabilities ω conditional on each mixture component:
• Compute (vector) unconditional posterior probability:
• Draw z ∼ Bernoulli (p 2 ).
2. Partition α conditional on z.
• Partition α into two vectors, α 1 and α 2 , corresponding to those elements of α from each of the mixture components, and let N i = rows(α i ).
3. Draw V i conditional on z, µ i , α i .
• Because of the gamma prior, the posterior on V i is not a known distribution and is sampled using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings draw.
4. Draw µ i conditional on V i , α i .
• • If the most recent draws of µ i violate this constraint, revert to the previous values.
6. Draw w conditional on z.
• Compute posterior vector hyper-parameter:
• Draw w ∼ Dirichlet π posterior .
7. Draw V j ε conditional on R j , F, α j , β j .
• Because of the gamma prior, the posterior on V j ε is not a known distribution and is sampled using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings draw. 
• Draw β .
